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CASENOTES
Unemployment Benefits and the Religion
Clauses: A Recurring Conflict
This Casenote examines Thomas v. Review Board of the
Indiana Employment Security Division, in which the Supreme
Court of the United States extended unemployment benefits to
a claimant who had voluntarily terminated his employment for
religious reasons. The author discusses the application of the
first amendment religion clauses to cases of this nature, and
suggests that the Supreme Court did not properly balance the
claimant's right to the free exercise of his religion against the
state's interest in maintaining its unemployment compensation
system. The author concludes that the Court's decision in-
creases the conflict between the establishment and free exercise
clauses of the first amendment.
After quitting his job, Eddie C. Thomas filed a claim for un-
employment compensation with the Indiana Employment Security
Division and his former employer, Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machin-
ery, Inc. Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness, explained that his religious
principles did not permit him to continue working for Blaw-Knox,
a company primarily engaged in the manufacture of armaments.
When Thomas was originally hired to work in the roll foundry, he
was assigned to a part of the firm not directly involved in the pro-
duction of weapons. Blaw-Knox closed the foundry nearly a year
later and Thomas was transferred to an area that actually pro-
duced armaments. Although his church did not explicitly forbid.
this employment, Thomas felt compelled by his religious principles
to refrain from directly engaging in the production of weapons. He
sought to transfer to a different department, only to discover that
all of the remaining departments at Blaw-Knox were directly in-
volved in armaments production. After Thomas's employer denied
his request for a layoff, he quit his job and applied for unemploy-
ment benefits.
The Employment Security Review Board, adopting a referee's
findings, concluded that Thomas was not entitled to unemploy-
ment benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act be-
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cause his decision to quit was not based on a "good cause [arising]
in connection with his work."' Sitting en banc, the Court of Ap-
peals of Indiana reversed the decision of the Review Board and
held that Thomas was entitled to benefits.2 The Supreme Court of
Indiana, in a three-to-two decision, vacated the intermediate ap-
pellate court's judgment and denied Thomas's claim.' On certio-
rari, the Supreme Court of the United States held, reversed: By
denying Thomas's application for unemployment benefits, Indiana
violated his first amendment right to the free exercise of his relig-
ion. Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Secur-
ity Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. . .. " Inevitably, tension exists between the free
exercise clause, which implies a limitation on otherwise permissible
governmental actions that interfere with the free exercise of relig-
ion, and the establishment clause, which implies governmental
neutrality so that government action does not favor any particular
religion or religion in general. Tension arises because too great an
emphasis on one clause may infringe on the rights protected by the
other clause. This nation has attracted or produced an assortment
of religious sects, many outside the mainstream of religious belief.
The first amendment requires that all of these diverse religious
convictions be accommodated, yet none awarded favored status.3
According to Thomas Jefferson, the purpose of the religion
clauses is to erect "a wall of separation between church and
State."6 Maintaining this "wall" is easier in theory than in prac-
tice. Although certain governmental actions would obviously inter-
fere impermissibly with religion, others not so obviously violative
of the religion clauses may also have indirect, adverse effects on
them.7
1. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 381 N.E.2d 888, 890 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1978) (en banc), vacated, 391 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 707 (1981);
see IND. CODE § 22-4-15-1 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
2. 381 N.E.2d at 895.
3. 391 N.E.2d at 1134.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. The Supreme Court has declared that its role in the inherent conflict is "to find a
neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms,
and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."
Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
6. 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904).
7. One commentator has suggested that although there is no comprehensive definition
of the establishment clause, "it means at least that government may not prefer one religion
[Vol. 36:585
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND RELIGION
The Supreme Court has held that mandatory Bible reading in
public schools is unconstitutional, as is payment from public
funds of the salaries of instructors who teach secular subjects at
parochial schools.' On the other hand, subsidizing bus transporta-
tion for, and loaning textbooks to, students attending sectarian
schools have been held constitutional. 10 Given the government's
purportedly neutral role, this indirect public aid to parochial
schools may appear to violate the establishment clause. Neutrality
is maintained, however, because of the state's primarily secular
purpose of providing all children with an adequate education, re-
gardless of what type of school they attend.11 The challenge is to
balance desirable legislative goals against the danger of excessive
governmental involvement in religious matters, which may occur
when the state's interests interact with the religious sphere.1"
Controversy over the free exercise of religious beliefs often
surfaces when religion mandates unlawful behavior. An early ex-
ample is Reynolds v. United States," in which the Mormon defen-
dant argued that a statute prohibiting bigamy was unconstitutional
as applied to him because it conflicted with a Mormon law that
permitted and even encouraged polygamy. The Supreme Court
over another, or prefer religion over non-religion." Note, The Constitutionality of an Em-
ployer's Duty to Accommodate Religious Beliefs and Practices, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 635,
649 (1980).
8. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
9. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
10. In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court justified the use of pub-
lic funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school students by stressing the state's interest in
the welfare of all children, whether they attend public or private institutions. Id. at 17-18.
In Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1958), the Court held that a New York statute
requiring public school authorities to lend textbooks to all students, including those attend-
ing parochial schools, did not violate the free exercise and establishment clauses. The Court
stressed that only secular books were loaned, and that the benefit of the statute accrued to
the students, not to the parochial schools. Id. at 243-45.
11. The Supreme Court has developed a three-part test to determine whether laws that
may aid religious institutions are permissible under the establishment clause: "First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose. Second, it must have a 'primary effect' that
neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the statute and its administration must avoid
excessive government entanglement with religion." Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358
(1975) (citations omitted); accord Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973).
12. An interesting variation of the balancing test in the realm of education is found in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which several Amish parents had been convicted
for violating Wisconsin's mandatory school attendance law. The Supreme Court held that
the state's interest in universal education did not override the Amish practice of declining to
send their children to public school after completion of the eighth grade to ensure their
continued religious and vocational training in the Amish community. Id. at 215-19.
13. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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held that although the laws of the government "cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.""
Almost a century later, in Braunfeld v. Brown,1 5 Orthodox
Jewish merchants challenged a Pennsylvania criminal statute that
proscribed the sale of certain goods on Sundays. The merchants
contended that because their faith required the closing of their
shops on Saturdays, the statute seriously impaired their ability to
earn a livelihood." The Court held that the strong state interest in
establishing a universal day of rest should not be hampered by a
constitutional prohibition of conduct regulation simply because
that regulation may result in economic disadvantage to some reli-
gious groups and not to others.1 7 These inequities would be toler-
ated if the burden on the affected groups was indirect."
Although the Court has not overruled Braunfeld, its thinking
about the free exercise of religion underwent a metamorphosis
characterized by the landmark case of Sherbert v. Verner.9 Sher-
bert's employer discharged her because she refused to work on Sat-
urday, which according to her religion was a day of rest.20 The Em-
ployment Security Commission of South Carolina rejected
Sherbert's claim for unemployment compensation benefits, finding
that her unavailability for Saturday work brought her within the
disqualifying provisions of the South Carolina unemployment com-
pensation statute. Sherbert contended that the disqualifying provi-
sions of the statute abridged her right to the free exercise of her
religious beliefs. The Court agreed: "[T]o condition the availability
of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal
principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise
of her constitutional liberties.""
Conscientious objection to military service is another area in
14. Id. at 166.
15. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
16. Id. at 601.
17. Id. at 606.
18. See id.
19. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Sherbert Court avoided overruling Braunfeld by reasoning
that a state had a stronger interest in maintaining a universal day of rest than in denying
unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians. Id. at 408-09. And in Sherbert, the state failed to
prove that the statute was necessary to maintain the integrity of its unemployment system
by preventing false claims. Id. at 406-07.
20. Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, had worked for her ex-employer for two years
without being required to work on Saturdays, After she was fired, other prospective employ-
ers declined to hire her because of her unwillingness to work on her sabbath. Id. at 399 nn.1
& 2.
21. Id. at 406.
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which the Court has closely scrutinized the free exercise and estab-
lishment clauses. Although not constitutionally compelled to ex-
empt concientious objectors from military service,22 Congress has
provided in section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act that
any person who "by reason of religious training and belief, is con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form," shall be
exempt from military conscription.2 s The conscientious objector
cases involve two distinct issues: (1) whether the person objected
to war in any form, and (2) whether the objection was based on
religious training and belief. These issues have created distinct
problems for the Court and should be discussed separately.
The Court has clearly established the meaning of opposition to
"war in any form." Gillette v. United States" involved conscien-
tious objectors who did not oppose all wars, but objected to partici-
pation in the Vietnam conflict because they viewed it as an unjust
war. Gillette believed in a "humanist approach to religion,"2 5 and
Negre, the other petitioner in a consolidated appeal, was a Roman
Catholic. 26 They contended that the religion clauses forbade con-
struing the statute to deny them an exemption from military duty
if they opposed only one particular war while adherents of faiths
traditionally opposed to all wars were exempted.27 The Supreme
Court held that this construction of section 6(j) did not violate the
free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment.2 8
The Court cited "valid neutral reasons" for limiting the exemption,
which focuses on individual conscientious beliefs and not on secta-
rian affiliations, to persons conscientiously opposed to war in any
form.29
The Court considered the scope of section 6(j)'s "religious
22. See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 266-67 (1934); United
States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931).
23. Military Selective Service Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1976). Section 6(j) also
provides in part,
Nothing contained in this title. . . shall be construed to require any person
to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the
United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the term
"religious training and belief" does not include essentially political, sociological,
or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.
24. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
25. Id. at 439.
26. Id. at 440-41.
27. Id. at 448.
28. Id. at 450-54, 461-62.
29. See id. at 452-55.
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training and belief" language in United States v. Seegers0 and
Welsh v. United States.31 In Seeger the Court reversed the convic-
tions of three men who refused induction into the military.3 2 See-
ger, one of the defendants, claimed an exemption as a conscien-
tious objector based on his religious beliefs, even though he left
open the question whether he believed in a Supreme Being as the
statute then required.38 The Court held that the test of a "belief in
a relation to a Supreme Being" under the former version of section
6(j) was whether it was a "sincere and meaningful" belief occupy-
ing in the life of its possessor a place analogous to that filled by the
God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption. ' To fall
within the exemption, the belief need not be mandated by any or-
ganized religion. Instead, a court should determine whether the
registrant sincerely holds his beliefs and "whether they are, in his
own scheme of things, religious."35 The Court construed section
6(j) to include "all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a
power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or
upon which all else is ultimately dependent." 6 While giving the
phrase "religious training and belief" an expansive interpretation,
the Court adhered to the statutory language excluding from the
exemption beliefs that are based on a "merely personal moral
code.""
In Welsh the Court confronted a similar issue. Despite his
claim to a section 6(j) exemption, Welsh was convicted for refusing
induction into the military. Welsh stated that his opposition to war
30. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
31. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
32. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187-88.
33. Id. at 166. When Seeger was convicted, § 60) provided in part,
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to
be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed
to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connec-
tion means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving du-
ties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include es-
sentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral
code.
Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604, 612-13 (current version at 50
U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1976)). The exemption no longer requires belief in a Supreme Being.
Cf. supra note 23.
34. 380 U.S. at 166.
35. Id. at 185.
36. Id. at 176.
37. See id. at 186. The Court, however, stated that exceptions to § 60) must be nar-
rowly construed. To fall within the exception, a personal moral code must be the sole basis
for the registrant's belief. Id.
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was not derived from a religious belief, but arose from his reading
of history and sociology.38 Nevertheless, the Court reversed his
conviction, reasoning that Seeger was controlling.3 9 Welsh's own
assessment that his views were not religious was not determinative,
the Court explained, because few registrants were likely to be
aware of the Court's broad construction of the word "religious. '40
The Court held that section 6(j) exempted from military service
"all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethi-
cal, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they
allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war." '41
Although Seeger and Welsh involved construction of a statute
rather than interpretation of the Constitution, the Court appar-
ently intended to avoid a conflict with the establishment clause by
its expansive (and perhaps erroneous) interpretation of section
6(j). 2 Concurring in Welsh, Justice Harlan reasoned that section
6(j) violated that clause by permitting exemptions only for reli-
gious beliefs, in the ordinary theistic sense of the term."'
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Secur-
ity Division exemplifies the classic tension between the free exer-
cise clause and the establishment clause in a context that combines
the pivotal issues of the cases discussed above. The crux of
Thomas was whether denying unemployment compensation
abridged the claimant's right of free exercise of religion, or whether
granting those benefits violated the establishment clause. On the
one hand, the Court must avoid the "excessive governmental en-
tanglement" produced by favoring one or all religions.4 But Sher-
bert held that a state may not compel someone to choose between
a fundamental precept of his religion and his job.45 Thomas, how-
ever, did not claim a Sabbatarian exemption; he claimed a consci-
entious objection to the nature of his employment, similar to con-
scientious objection to war.46
38. 398 U.S. at 341.
39. See id. at 340-43.
40. Id. at 341.
41. Id. at 344. The Court explained that registrants are not entitled to the exemption
when their beliefs are not deeply held or when their "objection to war does not rest at all
upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely upon considerations of
policy, pragmatism, or expediency." Id. at 342-43.
42. See id. at 344-45, 350-51, 354 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. See id. at 356-57. Because the exemption created a religious benefit, the establish-
ment clause required the reversal of Welsh's conviction. See id. at 362.
44. See aupra note 11.
45. See supra text accompanying note 21.
46. See 450 U.S. at 707.
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Moreover, Thomas's objection to his employment was based
on neither a cardinal religious tenet nor even a uniform belief
among Jehovah's Witnesses."' The question thus arose whether
Thomas was merely asserting a personal or philosophical belief,
which is not entitled to first amendment protection. The Supreme
Court of Indiana focused on this issue,4 8 and a brief review of the
state court opinion will help elucidate its complexity.
That the Supreme Court of Indiana decided Thomas by a 3-2
margin evidences the unsettled nature of the issues involved. The
majority opined that since Thomas's congregation did not require
that he leave his job and the basis of his religious belief was un-
clear, his dilemma did not violate the kind of cardinal religious
tenet at stake in Sherbert. Consequently, Thomas's decision did
not require first amendment protection.4 9 A majority of the court
also noted that Thomas was willing to return to a position in the
roll foundry even though he was fully aware that all Blaw-Knox
operations involved the production of armaments.50
Justice Hunter, in dissent, rejected the notion that a reviewing
court should say when and in what job a religious adherent com-
promised his religious beliefs." He found persuasive the decision
of the Indiana Employment Security Review Board that Thomas
did indeed quit his job because of his religious convictions. On the
basis of that finding, he considered it improper for the reviewing
court to reconsider whether Thomas's convictions were religious.52
In denying Thomas unemployment benefits, the Indiana Su-
preme Court's concern about whether Thomas's beliefs were reli-
gious or philosophical was misplaced. That Thomas's congregation
did not require him to quit does not automatically make his choice
philosophical rather than religious. The draft exemption cases
have liberally interpreted section 6(j) of the Military Selective Ser-
vice Act to extend the statute's exemption to persons whose sin-
cerely held moral beliefs precluded their participation in war.53
One commentator has suggested that in Seeger and Welsh the
Court "was telling Congress that an exemption limited to religious
objectors would probably violate the establishment clause."'
47. See id. at 715.
48. See 391 N.E.2d at 1131-34.
49. Id. at 1133.
50. Id. at 1131.
51. Id. at 1135 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 24-41.
54. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Y A
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Whether or not Thomas's church mandated his behavior should be
irrelevant if his personal beliefs compelled his actions."
The Supreme Court of the United States found it unnecessary
to consider the validity of Thomas's beliefs and focused instead on
the constitutional issues."' The Court resolved the tension between
the two religion clauses by holding that (a) the state's denial of
unemployment benefits violated Thomas's first amendment right
to free exercise of his religious beliefs, and (b) payment of those
benefits would not violate the establishment clause. 7 Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Burger explained the Court's unwilling-
ness to pass judgment on Thomas's beliefs: "Thomas drew a line,
and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasona-
ble one. Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs be-
cause . . . [the] beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and pre-
cision that a more sophisticated person might employ.""
The majority's reference to Thomas's difficulty in articulating
his beliefs is significant. An examination of the portions of
Thomas's testimony included in the Thomas opinion suggests that
one may attribute Thomas's difficulties, in part, to his communica-
tive inadequacies.5' Commentators have suggested that the linguis-
tic skills of the conscientious objector bear a direct relationship to
the credence given his beliefs.6 This may well have been the case
in Thomas, for the excerpts reveal that the petitioner was far from
articulate."' In awarding Thomas benefits, however, the Court
stressed that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, con-
sistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amend-
ment protection. ' '62
The majority held that a reviewing court's role in cases like
Thomas is merely "to determine whether there was an appropriate
finding that petitioner terminated his work because of an honest
L.J. 1205, 1320 (1970).
55. In Seeger Justice Clark emphasized that "[lI]ocal boards and courts are not free to
reject beliefs because they consider them 'incomprehensible.' Their task is to decide whether
the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own
scheme of things, religious." 380 U.S. at 184-85.
56. 450 U.S. at 716.
57. Id. at 717.
58. Id. at 715.
59. For excerpts of the transcripts, see id. at 714-15.
60. See Comment, The History and Utility of the Supreme Court's Present Definition
of Religion, 26 Loy. L. REv. 87, 104 (1980); Comment, The Legal Relationship of Con-
science to Religion: Refusals to Bear Arms, 38 U. CH. L. IEv. 583, 610 (1971).
61. See 450 U.S. at 714-15.
62. Id. at 714.
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conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion."" Since
the record clearly indicated that Thomas had "terminated his em-
ployment for religious reasons," the Court found Sherbert v. Ver-
ner controlling." ' Accordingly, the Court concluded that Indiana
must award Thomas unemployment benefits to avoid compelling
him "to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right
and participation in an otherwise available public program." 5
The Court acknowledged that state legislation that impinges
on religious liberty may be permissible if "it is the least restrictive
means of achieving some compelling state interest.""6 Indiana
claimed two interests to justify the denial of unemployment bene-
fits: (1) compensating people who quit their jobs for personal rea-
sons would place a severe financial burden on the unemployment
compensation fund, and (2) denying benefits in these cases would
avoid the need for employers to conduct a detailed inquiry into
their applicants' religious beliefs.6 7 The majority concluded, how-
ever, that these state interests did not outweigh the adverse effect
that denying benefits would place on the free exercise of religion."
The Thomas majority summarily dismissed the argument that
granting Thomas benefits would violate the establishment clause."
While admitting that Thomas would be deriving a benefit from his
religious beliefs, "in a sense," Chief Justice Burger reasoned that
no other choice was available in light of Sherbert: "Unless we are
prepared to overrule Sherbert, . . . Thomas cannot be denied the
benefits due him on the basis of the findings of the referee . . .
that he terminated his employment because of his religious convic-
tions. '7 0 Obviously, the Court is not prepared to overrule Sherbert.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, castigated the majority for what
he viewed as its holding that "Indiana is constitutionally required
to provide direct financial assistance to a person solely on the basis
of his religious beliefs" and thereby "add mud to the already mud-
died waters of First Amendment jurisprudence. 7 1 While agreeing
63. Id. at 716.
64. Id. at 713, 716-20; see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
65. 450 U.S. at 716.
66. Id. at 718.
67. Id. at 718-19.
68. Id. at 719. The Court found no evidence in the record indicating the ,likelihood of
many similar claims being filed, sufficient either to burden Indiana's unemployment com-
pensation system or to cause employers to make searching inquiries about the religious be-
liefs of their applicants. Id.
69. See id. at 719-20.
70. Id. at 720.
71. Id. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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with the majority that there is a tension between the free exercise
and the establishment clauses, Justice Rehnquist observed that the
tension was of recent origin and largely the result of the Court's
previous decisions.7 2 He identified three reasons for the tension be-
tween the clauses. First, the growth in social legislation has in-
creased governmental involvement in the private lives of individual
members of society. Second, by making the religious clauses appli-
cable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, the Court
has increased the potential for tension between the clauses. Fi-
nally, and to Justice Rehnquist most importantly, the Court has
exacerbated the problem by giving each clause an overly expansive
interpretation.3
Justice Rehnquist argued that the Thomas majority opinion
exemplified the Court's tendency to interpret the free exercise
clause too broadly.7 4 He would have adopted the interpretation of
the free exercise clause in Braunfeld v. Brown.7" According to Jus-
tice Rehnquist, Braunfeld held that when "a State has enacted a
general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the
State's secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not . . . re-
quire the State to conform that statute to the dictates of religious
conscience of any group. '7 6 Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the
Thomas Court's broad reading of the free exercise clause logically
could be extended to prevent states from denying reimbursement
to students who chose to attend parochial schools for religious rea-
sons,77 which would certainly violate the establishment clause as
the Court has interpreted it in previous decisions. 78
Justice Rehnquist also chastised the majority for dismissing
the conflict with the establishment clause by simply asserting that
the decision "'plainly' does not foster the 'establishment' of relig-
ion." 7 9 If Indiana had enacted a statute specifically providing bene-
fits for those who quit their jobs for religious reasons, Justice
Rehnquist believed that the statute would violate the establish-
ment clause as the Court has interpreted it.80 Yet, the majority
72. Id. at 721.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 722-23.
75. 366 U.S. 699 (1961).
76. 450 U.S. at 723.
77. Id. at 724 n.2.
78. Id. at 724-25.
79. Id. at 724.
80. Id. at 725.
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opinion requires Indiana to provide these benefits. 81 Justice Rehn-
quist interpreted the establishment clause only to prohibit govern-
ment action that aids the proselytizing activities of religious
groups, while permitting actions that accommodate individual
choices.82 Under his interpretation, a state could voluntarily award
unemployment benefits to people who sever their employment for
religious reasons without violating the establishment clause."
Justice Rehnquist recognized some of the major deficiencies of
the majority opinion. The opinion does not provide a framework
for ascertaining when, in future similar situations, states must
award unemployment benefits to employees who voluntarily termi-
nate their employment." Leaving the issue to case-by-case deter-
mination is impracticable and ill-advised. Because courts are pre-
cluded from inquiring into the validity of religious beliefs,8 5 the
potential for abuse is disconcerting. Any person may now quit his
job, assert a religious (or even purely personal) basis for doing so,
and receive unemployment compensation.8" If a state refuses to
award benefits in such a case, a court may not inquire into the
objective validity of the individual's beliefs-his actual personal
religious beliefs control. Once a person demonstrates, to some un-
specified degree, that he quit his job because of those beliefs, he
will be eligible for unemployment compensation unless the state
can successfully establish a superior state interest.
The majority briefly considered the possibility of "an asserted
claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be
entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause," but dis-
missed this possibility by noting that such was "not the case
here. '8 7 Yet Chief Justice Burger reiterated that "[c]ourts are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretation." 88 How, then, are the courts to
determine, on a case-by-case basis, what beliefs are clearly nonreli-
gious, without delving into these purportedly religious beliefs? The
answer unfortunately appears to be that administrative panels and
courts are left with no effective method of ascertaining the validity
of these claims. A claimant would have a prima facie case if he
merely asserted that his religion compelled him to quit his job. Of
81. See id. at 726.
82. See id. at 726-27.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 722.
85. 450 U.S. at 715-16.
86. See id. at 723 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. 450 U.S. at 715.
88. Id. at 716.
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course, courts may inquire into the sincerity of beliefs, but this is a
difficult undertaking. The distinction between inquiring into a per-
son's sincerity and examining the validity of his beliefs is often
ephemeral.
The personal/religious beliefs dichotomy underscores another
weakness of the Thomas decision. The example of the draft ex-
emption cases could be extended to imply that one need not even
claim a religious affiliation to qualify for unemployment benefits
under the Thomas rationale.8 Since discrimination among reli-
gions or action in favor of religion in general violates the religion
clauses, 90 a sincerely held moral belief could receive the same
treatment as a religiously related belief. Of course, awarding bene-
fits on the basis of nonreligious beliefs may result in even more
abuse of state unemployment compensation systems by persons
who wish merely to sever employment and collect benefits but do
not have a sincere belief that precludes their employment.
The Thomas Court avoided resolution of the continuing ten-
sion between the religion clauses by authorizing a case-by-case de-
termination of unemployment compensation claims by persons
purportedly terminating their employment for religious reasons.
The Court has simultaneously expanded the free exercise clause
and obscured the establishment clause by providing a basis for
claims not only by persons whose beliefs are religious, but also by
those whose beliefs may be neither religious nor sincere. In future
cases, courts will have no guidance in determining which claims to
honor and which to reject.
DIANE DEIGHTON FERRARO
89. See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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